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Abstract. Our ﬁscal process divorces payment from use. While this divorce has led many analysts of government 
to separate discussion of public expenditures from their funding, or use from payment, we argue that this approach 
does not provide a useful framework for understanding our public choices. We argue that it is the divorce of 
payment from use that underlies our ﬁscal process and, rather than simply “dismiss out of hand” the study of 
our ﬁscal process, it should be an integral part of our study of government. Our framework for describing ﬁscal 
institutions indicates how our ﬁscal process invites rent-seeking because it allows beneﬁciaries of programs to 
avoid payment for those programs. We conclude by examining how various changes in the ﬁscal process may 
inﬂuence our public choices. 
1. Introduction 
A rich tradition has grown up around the concept of “market failure,” whereby economists 
identify cases where the price system is believed to allocate resources in inefﬁcient or 
inequitable manners. The market failure approach essentially probes the price system for 
various and sundry ﬂaws and then catalogues a wide variety of cases where government 
is argued to improve results. But very little attention has been given to applying a price 
systems test to government. Our approach analyzes the government system by applying the 
price system as a benchmark to catalogue the roots of government failure. We argue that 
the underlying source of government failure is, by necessity or convention, that it must use 
inferior payment and allocation systems. Although this defect is basic, it is nevertheless 
essentially dismissed by most analysts. Unfortunately, many important insights regarding 
the causes of government failure have been neglected as a result of this dismissal of the 
most basic framework for understanding how government operates. 
Two reasons are likely for why most analysts do not apply a price systems test to govern­
ment. First, economists have more or less taken the government system for granted without 
inspecting the basic or elementary institutions of payments and expenditures. Rather than 
analyze how these institutions themselves inﬂuence resource allocation, they implicitly as­
sume that they do not. In this way, analysts are able then to argue that other factors, such as 
ideology, demographics, and sociological inﬂuences, are primary determinants of tax and 
expenditure policies, when, the spending and tax institutions themselves are often driving 
forces behind the spending and tax policies that take place. In other words, the spending 
and tax institutions themselves provide the framework under which spending and taxation 
  
 
arise, and therefore should be the ﬁrst step in modeling government. Second, some analysts 
may not have probed very deeply into understanding the power of markets, as displayed 
through the price system, and therefore ignore the institutional advantages given up when 
government, and its non-price method of allocating resources, is substituted for the price 
system of private markets. 
The nature of our ﬁscal process suggests why analysts have traditionally separated dis­
cussion of public expenditures from their funding, or use from payment. This separation is 
a convenient way to deal with the divorce of payment from use. This convenience, however,
carries a major cost: understanding how our ﬁscal process inﬂuences our public choices. 
Differences between payment mechanisms in private and public sectors are obvious, but 
the literature does not dwell on them. While, 30 years ago, James Buchanan (1967: 16) 
concluded: “The effects of the institutions of payment on individual choice behavior are 
more important in ﬁscal choice than they are in market choice,” effects on individual choice 
behavior in public markets remain mostly ignored. In this paper, we argue that it is this di­
vorce that provides the underlying key to understanding the public expenditures we receive
and, rather than simply “dismiss out of hand” the study of our ﬁscal process, it should be 
an integral part of our study of government. 
Our framework for analyzing collective choices follows Knut Wicksell’s (1896) pro­
posal that spending decisions be coupled with the means by which to ﬁnance programs.1 
This framework for describing ﬁscal institutions indicates how our ﬁscal process invites 
rent-seeking because it allows seekers, or beneﬁciaries, of programs to avoid payment for 
those programs. In effect, our ﬁscal process transforms all public programs into “transfer” 
programs in the sense that beneﬁciaries often do not pay the full per-unit costs of their 
programs. As Gordon Tullock (1989) argues, the political system recognizes the need to 
camouﬂage transfers, or rent-seeking, and perhaps our ﬁscal process is the perfect avenue 
for this camouﬂage. We conclude by examining how various changes in the ﬁscal process 
may inﬂuence our public choices. 
2. Some History on the “Divorce” 
Buchanan (1967) argues that the divorce of payment from use owes its existence to the lack 
of an exchange process between kings and subjects. Kings merely enjoyed spending public 
funds, and tax authorities simply collected revenues to meet those enjoyments. There was 
a clear distinction then between spenders—the king—and tax collector(s). 
Buchanan (1967: 94–95) writes: 
We know that political structures, as they operate, do incorporate institutions that 
tend to produce this apparent splitting of the ﬁscal decisions into the two parts. 
These same structures contain, however, other institutions that have been developed 
to resolve the potential conﬂict. Historically, legislative bodies, through which the 
preferences of individual citizens are most directly represented, have exercised more 
control over revenue or tax decisions than they have over expenditure decisions. 
In part this asymmetry has its origin in the development of democratic political 
institutions out of monarchical institutions. Representative bodies, parliaments, 
ﬁrst achieved the power to restrict the tax-gathering privileges of the kings. Before 
taxes could be levied on the people, representative bodies were given the right to 
grant their approval. No consideration was given to the spending side of the account 
because public expenses were assumed to beneﬁt primarily the royal court, at least in 
the early days of constitutional monarchy. Taxes were viewed as necessary charges 
on the people, but they were not really conceived as any part of an “exchange” 
process from which the people secured public beneﬁts. It was out of this conception 
of the ﬁscal process that both the modern institutions and the modern theory of public 
ﬁnance developed. 
The emerging of modern democratic states dramatically modiﬁed the setting for the 
ﬁscal process, but only recently has attention been paid to the necessity of revising 
age-old norms. As royal courts came to be replaced by executives, and monarchies 
by republics, taxes continued to be viewed as necessary to sustain the expenses 
of “government,” with the burden of these taxes to be minimized to the maximum 
extent possible. Surprisingly little recognition has been given, even yet, to the idea 
that taxes must, in the ﬁnal analysis, be considered as the “costs” of those public 
goods and services which provide beneﬁts to the same people who pay taxes. 
3. The Divorce Problem 
The key to understanding our model is to realize that when we allow government to allocate 
resources, payment is separated from use. This is the divorce problem. Most government-
supplied goods are greatly subsidized or have zero prices for users. This means that uses 
of goods are separated from payment, which take the form of taxes. Taxes are virtually 
inescapable levies (in some cases, threat of coercion is involved) and, indeed, they must be 
since few citizens would offer sufﬁcient donations in the face of zero or greatly subsidized 
prices. Given greatly subsidized prices at the point of use, payments must come from a 
source that is virtually inescapable. We are not saying that this is necessarily bad, but it is 
most basic to understanding the institution of government. 
The supply of government goods is politically determined through the apparatus of repre­
sentative government. And so, on one side of the coin, we have use determined largely by 
politics, and on the other side, payment for such services mostly separated from the former 
via taxes levied on “intermediate bases” (income, retail sales, and so forth). This system 
is akin to supplying automobiles to citizens with small deductibles or user fees and then 
ﬁnancing the bulk of the expenses involved through a tax on income. It appears to us that 
this divorce between use and payment, as viewed from the lens of private market theory, 
has quite fatal implications for the type of government we receive. 
First, voters have little incentive to signal the same demands for spending that would arise 
in the private market where use and payment are married. That is, the ﬁscal institutions 
themselves cause a demand that is quite different from what that same individual would 
demand when that good was provided through the private market. In the latter, users must 
pay full per-unit costs, while in the former, they do not. 
  
Second, while payment and use may be joined through the practice of tax-earmarking that 
directs proceeds from taxes to payment of speciﬁc programs, this seldomly occurs at any 
signiﬁcant level in the government sector.2 For instance, taxes on gasoline consumption 
are often earmarked for funding of public highways, and therefore taxes are levied on 
those who beneﬁt from public roads. A recent study of state governments by Arturo 
Perez and Ronald Snell (1995) indicates that, while, on average, roughly 25 percent of 
all state taxes are labeled “earmarked,” little connection between payment and use arises 
in practice.3 Also, when earmarking raises revenues below program costs, other sources 
make up the difference by taxing non-users, or infrequent users, that consequently subsidize 
frequent users. Transfers therefore arise in practice. The general tax fund ﬁnances spending 
programs, and no matter what a tax is called at its origin, all travel to the general fund where 
no beneﬁciary of any given program can tell the difference between a dollar raised through 
an income tax or an excise tax on gasoline. 
We recognize that one might argue that our current ﬁscal process is one where there 
is a contract that couples spending programs with tax programs. That is, with most of 
our funding through the so-called “general fund,” our ﬁscal process, in a sense, couples 
this mass of revenues with the mass of spending programs it ﬁnances. Therefore, market 
principles are at work in the sense that taxpayers compare their aggregate tax bill with the 
beneﬁts they receive from all the governments programs. Our point, however, is that the 
incentives and information that arise out of this ﬁscal process work themselves out very 
differently than a ﬁscal process that provides a more itemized comparison of spending and 
tax programs. While market principles will be applied in either case, it is doubtful that 
voters would make the same choices under either ﬁscal process. Our paper develops these 
differences. 
4. The Dilution of Voluntary Rights 
Using inescapable levies, or taxes, means that the voluntary part of the exchange process 
between buyer, or taxpayer, and supplier, or government, is greatly weakened. If the 
taxpayer does not use a particular good, or has little use for it, he is subject to a net-loss 
situation if he cannot avoid the taxes involved. Of course, at the same time, other taxpayers 
would be undoubtedly receiving large net beneﬁts. 
Once payment is no longer completely voluntary (as it cannot be when payment and use 
are separated), the ability to transfer income from one set of citizens to another becomes 
quite large. This problem would, of course, never occur in private markets since consumers 
are not forced to pay. If they feel that costs of products are less than beneﬁts, they simply 
do not purchase such products. In other words, they have the power of egress, or the ability 
to exit markets. But with government provision, many citizens are forced into net-loss 
situations because they cannot freely or easily exit or egress such situations. 
We are not arguing that citizens are complete “sitting ducks,” or that taxation must be all 
“bad.” Through their lobbying, voting, location, and work behaviors, citizens can and do 
inﬂuence ﬁscal decisions. However, compared to the private market, the range or magnitude 
of “voluntariness” is greatly diminished. 
  
5. Relative Absences of Prices and Information 
Once payment and use of a good are split, prices no longer exist to guide the voter-consumer. 
Since taxes are typically applied to intermediate bases, and the voters-consumers pay taxes 
in manners essentially disconnected from actual uses of government goods, the link between 
costs and beneﬁts provided through the price mechanism is destroyed. 
But, the divorce does not mean a total loss of signal. Taxes do reduce purchasing power 
and, in this way, signal to individuals about costs of government. Yet, such signals are very 
imprecise. An individual can reckon his tax bill and make a judgment as to how this relates 
to beneﬁts he may receive, but such a comparison is of a different kind than what takes place 
in private markets where consumers can precisely compare per unit costs of items (price) 
with personal beneﬁts. With government supply, the consumer-voter struggles to make a 
sensory perception by somehow adding up his many demand curves for government goods 
and comparing this sensation of beneﬁt with his overall tax bill. An analogous situation 
would be where all food consumed by individuals was provided at zero prices by thousands 
of retailers, only to be ﬁnanced from a federal income tax paid to retailer-contractors who 
in turn compensate others in the vertical chain of production. 
6. Model of Sensory Perception with Divorce 
Public ﬁnance economists have long understood that tax assignments and beneﬁts received 
from spending programs bear little connection within our ﬁscal process.4 But, to our knowl­
edge, very few analysts have modeled the personal cost-beneﬁt calculus for government 
supply in the context of divorce. Analysts typically have done one of two things at this 
juncture. The ability-to-pay school and excess-burden school basically take the divorce 
problem as a given. Rather than attempting to develop a personal calculus that would pre­
dict how rational actors would behave under the divorce problem, they have chosen to split 
taxation apart from beneﬁts. For the excess-burden wing, this means looking at taxes from 
the viewpoint of the benevolent ﬁsc attempting to minimize allocation distortions of the tax 
code. For the ability-to-pay wing, the process is one of generating equity or fairness by 
solely focusing on individual tax burdens. 
The other approach could be loosely tabbed the voluntary-exchange approach. It attempts 
to force the calculus of the price system onto the consumer-voter by trying to marry beneﬁts 
with costs. This approach, however, completely vaults over the institutional features that 
characterize the divorce problem when it forces a tax-price argument into government 
supply. It is akin to saying lets “make believe” that people are buying government services 
at “tax-prices.” The government is then seen as some sort of giant user-fee machine. 
However, as we have argued above, this is far from the ﬁscal institutions in place today. 
Our voting process is dominated by simple majority voting and the median voter is com­
monly believed to be decisive.5 Under this framework, a tax increase placed on the median 
voter results in a lower quantity of government good and, in this sense, mirrors the result—a 
decrease in quantity demanded—that arises when a private supplier raises price. But, this is 
a misleading framework because, under our ﬁscal process, ﬁscal “shoppers” recognize no 
clear nexus between taxes and beneﬁts. This discussion indicates that the user-fee frame­
  
work whereby the median voter connects taxation with beneﬁts associated with individual 
spending programs is inappropriate for examining ﬁscal choices. Edgar Browning (1975) 
demonstrates how general fund ﬁnancing creates many possible outcomes within the me­
dian voter framework because, unlike “true” earmarking, general fund ﬁnancing no longer 
connects taxation with spending. Browning (1975), however, does not examine how tax 
assignments may vary within a ﬁscal process founded upon the tax-spending divorce that 
creates incentives for taxpayers to seek low tax assignments. But, both ﬁscal variables— 
spending and taxation—are determined, not by benevolent despots, but through a political 
process that divorces payment from use. There are many ways for government programs 
to be implemented and therefore no unique connection between how the median voter 
responds to a tax hike or fall exists. 
To build a more accurate model, we begin with the features inherent in divorce. Taxes 
are modeled as “side payments” or lump-sum levies, and not tax-prices, since individuals 
generally do not link taxes on a per-unit basis with beneﬁts of government goods. The 
general case is where taxes are simply dumped into a general fund and then re-circulated 
into ﬁnancing thousands of programs at greatly subsidized or zero prices. In this world, 
the consumer-voter views taxes in lump-sum form, where he would have a rough idea of 
what this large lump sum is as it is extracted from a variety of intermediate bases. For the 
income tax, this would be a fairly accurate tally, but for other taxes such as the sales tax 
this may be less accurate. For other taxes, such as the corporate income tax, the sensory 
perception could break down completely if it is assumed that the public treats the corporation 
as an abstract entity apart from the consumer-voter and believes that this tax is not partially 
shifted to him in some way (e.g., through lower wages or higher product prices). Indeed, 
an implication of our model is that moving the tax system toward less sensory bases such 
as sales and corporate taxes may be sub-optimal. 
An important implication at this point is that, when the consumer-voter perceives the 
lump sum tax “blob,” he has little notion of per-unit costs of goods supplied and therefore 
cannot allocate his budget at will. He can only assert his consumer “choice” rights through 
the costly process of politics or by exiting to other political jurisdictions.6 
Turning to the beneﬁt or goods side, the individual calculus remains blurred. The con­
cepts of egress and interlocking consumption loom large on the beneﬁts side. One of the 
paramount features of private markets is the ability of individuals to exit markets at will and 
consume items where personal beneﬁts exceed cost. The process is divisible which means 
that consumers are not connected or necessarily tied to the consumption of other projects 
since the ability to egress prevents this from happening. The consumer-voter is not forced 
to co-ﬁnance goods on which he places no value. Moreover, the consumer cannot be forced 
to contribute to negative sum projects; in other words, he does not have to cross-subsidize 
others. Moreover, he cannot force others to cross-subsidize him. 
By contrast, goods supplied by government represent interlocking consumption or es­
sentially tied consumption. This is because most consumption is co-ﬁnanced, so that the 
consumer-voter, in effect, co-ﬁnances the whole product line supplied by government. 
Locked or tied consumption simply means that the consumer-voter cannot egress product 
lines supplied by government. He may, of course, not use a particular program, but he still 
must contribute to such a program even if he does not agree with such supply. For example, 
  
 
 
 
the consumer-voter may suffer net losses from the agricultural price support program, but, 
in addition to paying higher prices for agricultural goods, he still must contribute some 
portion of his taxes to the program. Moreover, it is doubtful that the typical taxpayer would 
know the per unit tax he is charged to ﬁnance that program and therefore will have trouble 
performing an accurate cost-beneﬁt test to the program. 
Locked or tied consumption implies some rather odd behavior on the part of the consumer-
voter. Essentially it implies one of two things: rational ignorance or rational advocacy.
Let us ﬁrst discuss rational ignorance. In private markets, consumers are often rationally 
ignorant about commodities they do not consume. A person who does not like ﬁshing is 
rationally ignorant about prices of ﬁshing equipment—he couldn’t care less. Moreover, this 
does not hurt the non-ﬁsherman in any way since he is not co-ﬁnancing ﬁshing equipment. 
In the terminology of divorce, he can avoid negative sum situations through egress. 
All that is required for efﬁciency in the ﬁshing equipment market is that ﬁshermen devote 
time to consumer research. And, we would expect that considerable consumer “research” 
would occur. Thousands of ﬁshermen scan catalogues, travel to stores to view prices, 
visit trade conventions, and compare notes with other ﬁshermen. The volume of consumer 
research summed over all private goods in our society is enormous and it seems somewhat 
of an anomaly that economists do not dwell or bother to compute the vast social beneﬁts of 
this research effort. It is, perhaps, the very reason why markets work so well. 
Would the consumer-voter be expected to engage in such a research effort with respect to 
government supply? At ﬁrst, it might appear that each consumer-voter has a great incentive
to research everything that the government supplies since he co-ﬁnances the whole product 
line. In fact, some would say that he has a moral obligation to do so since his taxes support 
such supply. However, similar to our non-ﬁsherman case, there will be many government-
supplied goods that are simply “not germane” to the consumer-voter. For example, for those 
consumer-voters without children, we would expect that they would be mostly rationally 
ignorant about public schools. For the ﬁshing equipment market, we suggested that this 
“negligence” (rational ignorance) regarding non-germane consumption is no problem since 
ﬁshermens’ research efforts and the ability of non-ﬁshermen to egress assure that nobody 
is exploited. 
So to answer the above question, we should concentrate on the research efforts of those 
consumer-voters who consume germane products. Do they perform the social function 
of adequate consumer research? At ﬁrst thought, it would seem that users of germane 
products would, in fact, spend considerable time researching about them. For example, 
parents of public school children would be concerned about elementary education, social 
security recipients about monthly checks, and farmers about price supports. However,
this search process is tilted in a way that is fundamentally different from what arises in 
private markets. Given the divorce problem, per-unit price is not an important factor, and 
therefore the consumer-voter shops with little concern for price. Instead, he is concerned 
with standards of performance, such as the levels of school achievement, the timeliness of 
the social security checks, or the size of his support payments. 
Shopping without concern over prices, and without egress, is unlikely to generate optimal 
results. Most shoppers would become “rational advocates” for their favorite programs under 
these conditions. To be sure, while prices are not clearly posted there is, in effect, a shadow 
  
price that probably lurks in the sensory perception of shoppers. This may take the form of 
the extra tax, or additional public debt, that goes along with higher spending on programs. 
However, due to the co-ﬁnanced nature of supply, tax or debt costs of incremental supply 
are spread over all taxpayers, within and between generations. So, in effect, consumers of 
germane products are never paying true per-units cost associated with those programs. 
This tax “dilution” factor is likely to dominate the calculus of the consumer-voter in the 
presence of germane products. The cases of social security and farm price supports are 
clear. Recipients of these programs would clearly favor an expansion of their subsidy even 
if they were to reckon that their per-capita tax bill would rise to ﬁnance program expansions. 
They are, in effect, able to collect a large volume of taxes from other consumer-voters who 
do not use the programs, and therefore they receive cash transfers that are higher than any 
incremental rise in their tax burden. This suggests that the calculus of the consumer-voter 
of germane products is dominated by rational advocacy.
In the education case, the result is similar but with minor modiﬁcation. To begin with, this 
is not a case where a raw transfer of wealth occurs since there are, to some extent, external 
beneﬁts associated with education spending. Since education is a useful commodity with 
positive-sum aspects most people are willing to pay for some level of public education. 
Similar to the agricultural price support case above, consumer-voters that beneﬁt directly 
from education programs rationally spend time in consumer research. Nevertheless, this 
research process is dominated by tax dilution since any increment of output is co-ﬁnanced 
by consumer-voters who do not equally reap the beneﬁts of program expansion. For the 
education example, parents of school age children, and all those involved in the education 
industry (teachers, staff, construction ﬁrms, book publishers, etc.), reap higher incremental 
beneﬁts from government education programs than other citizens. So rational advocacy 
effects would be present for these individuals thus leading to a tendency for over-expansion 
of public spending. 
Perhaps, even more damaging is that consumer-voters have little concern for per-unit 
costs. Tax dilution works in this direction as well since co-ﬁnancing with non-users’ income 
generates large subsidies. But, perhaps the most important reason for over-expansion is 
that low-beneﬁt users cannot easily exit or egress which suggests that, even if an ambitious 
consumer of public education were to uncover rampant waste, gains from such a search are 
difﬁcult to earn since he cannot exit public education and retain his tax payment. Unlike the 
ﬁsherman, he ﬁnds it difﬁcult to avoid over-expansion unless he moves to another political 
jurisdiction, wins a selective tax cut,7 or somehow convinces policymakers to rein in the 
over-expansion. 
Our conclusion is that, while germane product users are concerned with some standard 
of performance, they are not particularly concerned with per-unit costs. Unlike private 
markets, where shoppers are researching per-unit prices, they have little incentive to expend 
the time and energy researching per-unit prices of the goods provided by government. The 
incentive structure associated with the ﬁscal institutions is tilted toward rational ignorance 
in this regard since the inability to egress means a nil payoff to consumer research; i.e., you 
cannot take your money and exit. 
An interesting question is: would pursuit of performance standards by germane consumer-
voters compress per-unit costs through political competition? Its answer will bring the 
 process of consumer research into focus. As we have argued, no one forces the great 
multitude of consumers in private markets to perform their daily task of researching goods 
and services. Directed by some ‘invisible hand,’ millions of consumers independently 
and willingly perform this vital task in pursuit of self-interest. The ability to egress and 
the absence of co-ﬁnancing assure this result. This process summed over all consumers 
represents a huge volume of effort; for example as much as $122 billion per year in the 
United States—if one assumes an hourly wage of $10, 10 minutes research per day, and 200 
million consumers. Everyone from a child allocating his allowance for toys to his parents 
searching for a new house is enlisted in this effort. The external beneﬁts of this search are 
very large since research efforts ensure lower prices and higher qualities, the beneﬁts of 
which are enjoyed by all consumers. Moreover, private ﬁrms are enlisted in this process by 
the very act of posting prices, advertising, and being rated and therefore unwittingly make 
the consumer research process more effective. Contrast this, for example, with a Medicare 
patient and his doctor where performance only matters—cost simply is not a factor since 
the bulk of the cost is tax ﬁnanced in such a way that draws funding from all those included 
in the tax base. 
Our cursory description of this remarkable process that takes place in private markets 
suggests why competition in the political sphere (within the world of divorce) could not 
possibly duplicate or match the prodigious research effort of private consumers. The mon­
itoring process in place for government supply could not possibly match the efﬁciency 
generating aspects of the consumer research process in market systems. Government may 
then be characterized as a place where “consumer failure” is rampant since, in compar­
ison to the private market, the supply of consumer-voter research is deﬁcient by market 
standards.8 
7. Implications of “Consumer Failure” 
Our model of the consumer-voter under divorce leads us to the concept of “consumer 
failure”, whereby consumer-voters of non-germane programs are rationally ignorant and 
therefore perform little consumer research even though they co-ﬁnance such programs, and 
this allows sizable transfers to take place. Users become rational advocates, and at the same 
time, are “poor” shoppers since they ignore per-unit prices and have little interest in seeking 
and minimizing per-unit costs. Neither users nor non-users can egress and, in effect, take 
their money and run. In this sense, the consumer failure we have uncovered in public supply 
is like a commons problem. 
The notion of rational advocacy is consistent with Buchanan’s (1967) argument that, under 
our ﬁscal process, demanders choose quantities consistent with maximum total beneﬁts, 
unconstrained by costs—i.e., they consume until marginal beneﬁts are zero. Buchanan 
(1967: 91) predicted that this ﬁscal process fosters public discussion dominated by the 
“needs” for various programs when he argued: “Almost universally, these ‘needs’ are 
measured or estimated independently of costs.” Extending the analysis to deﬁcit-spending, 
Buchanan argued that decisions are made in a budgetary world where there are really two 
separate, and unrelated, choices: spending and taxation. Spending yields beneﬁts that are 
maximized when marginal beneﬁts are driven to zero and taxation yields costs, which are 
  
 
 
minimized by voters. This separation creates a tendency toward deﬁcit-ﬁnance, or the 
choice to spend more than tax. 
In a similar vein, Richard Wagner (1992: 114) refers to a ﬁscal process where choice is 
divorced from liability, taxes or public debt, as one of “ﬁscal irresponsibility” that creates 
a “commons” institutional setting. Wagner also argues that tax and debt policies of local 
governments are constrained to the extent that property owners bear burdens of funded 
programs. This mirrors private property budgeting in the sense that liabilities show up in 
property values and leads to incentives for property owners to connect taxing with spend­
ing. A similar connection, however, is argued to be mostly absent in state and federal 
decisions. 
8. The Constitutional Perspective
Our paper argues that the “linchpin” underlying the political status quo is a ﬁscal pro­
cess where payment is divorced from use. Voters have incentives to demand tax relief at 
the same time they demand higher spending on programs that they directly beneﬁt from. 
To change this status quo, the divorce must go through a successful reconciliation, or, 
for that matter, successful marriage counseling that brings payment and use closer to­
gether. 
How do we get there from here? One approach follows the Marlow and Orzechowski 
(1988) and Orzechowski (1991) argument that political viability requires that tax reduction 
take place in a policy setting of quid pro quo. That is, in order to make voters accept 
spending reduction, they must be offered tax reduction in return. Under current ﬁscal 
processes, this exchange is problematic since, from the perspective of individual taxpayers, 
spending reduction has never been tied to equal tax relief. The current ﬁscal process simply 
does not require that voters engage in an exchange whereby they must give up beneﬁts 
in return for lower tax assignments. How does one get decisive voters to approve such 
fundamental change in the ﬁscal process that ultimately lowers their welfare? Moreover,
could this be approved through a current political system whereby decisive voter(s) and 
special interests have little to gain, but much to lose, from a new ﬁscal process that will 
likely lower their well-being? This point has been made before when Milton Friedman and 
Rose Friedman (1983) argued that it is the tyranny of the status quo that resists changes in 
public policy. An interesting side issue is whether the public would ever believe claims of 
a real quid pro quo when they have never had an incentive to think in terms of a marriage 
between use and payment. Historical norms of the ﬁscal process have a way of closing our 
minds to various alternative processes.9 
Another approach separates tax payments into several partitions: payments for defense, 
education, highways, transfers, etc. In other words, on April 15, each taxpayer must send 
ﬁve separate checks to ﬁve separate government agencies. This argument appears in Tullock 
(1989: 87), 
We can easily imagine this situation under present circumstances. Taxes could 
be allocated to individual bureaus, with the very large tax sources being broken 
up. The Department of Defense, to take an example at random, might receive 75 
  
 
percent of the personal income taxes, or possibly all of the income taxes collected 
from people whose income is in the top ﬁfth of the distribution pyramid. 
This is far removed from the private sector where consumers may send several hundred 
or more payments to suppliers, or via credit card companies, but it may promote greater 
connection between taxes paid and beneﬁts received. One would then be better able to 
view defense or welfare spending programs as “bargains” or “extortions.” This proposal 
is nothing new, as we have previously mentioned Wicksell’s (1896) proposal that voters 
choose spending programs that are tied to their ﬁnancing. This approach, however, suffers 
from the same status quo problems as the quid pro quo proposition: why would decisive
voter(s) or special interests ever approve such changes? Would, for instance, Social Security 
recipients prefer a ﬁscal process that places their program under greater public scrutiny? 
Yet, this approach has great attractions. As Tullock (1989: 87) notes, 
This would mean that individual bureaucracies and the rent seeking groups would, 
in essence, be put in a position where their success would depend on dealing with 
somewhat similar sized opposing groups. . . . The objective would be to set lobbyists 
and special interest groups against each other. 
Under such a ﬁscal process, spending and tax changes would be better viewed as a zero-sum 
game, with it being clearer who are winners and losers. It would likely make it much clearer 
who receives positive transfers, and who receives negative transfers and, in this sense, may 
offer a second-best solution to marrying beneﬁts and taxation. This ﬁscal process removes 
some of the camouﬂage surrounding the transfers that arise from the old ﬁscal process. It is 
an interesting question as to whether such knowledge would change incentives to vote, and 
therefore change the location of the median voter, or dominant special interest group(s). 
Our paper describes the crucial importance of designing an appropriate ﬁscal constitution 
in the ﬁrst place. Today’s government programs are a product of the divorce and this 
ﬁscal process predictably leads to programs that would not be chosen under a ﬁscal process 
that marries payment with use. We have outlined implications of this divorce and have
compared this ﬁscal process with that of the private market where payment and use are 
married. While, it is unclear how to alter the present ﬁscal process from the viewpoint of 
political viability, it does appear that we should stop using the private market analogy as a 
device for understanding public choices, as this analogy contributes little understanding to 
the connection between costs and beneﬁts perceived by voter-consumers. But, the private 
market analogy remains an appropriate framework for redesigning the ﬁscal constitution, 
and for those interested in changing the status quo, since it provides a framework for 
predicting how various changes that bring payment and use closer together may inﬂuence 
our future public choices. 
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Notes 
1. 	 While the common perception among public choice scholars is that Wicksell’s contribution lies mainly in his 
advocacy of the rule of unanimity, Wagner (1988) explains that Wicksell also provided the practical means of 
applying the rule of unanimity, with the coupling of spending and tax choices, to the constitution of Sweden’s 
ﬁscal process. The old Swedish constitution used to have a provision that allowed farmers to reject any new 
taxes, and although they did not normally have representation in the Parliament, the ﬁscal process effectively 
tied spending programs with their ﬁnancing. Wicksell believed that this historical tradition provided the 
necessary key for effectively putting his proposal into practice, since its previous position in the constitution 
opened the door for its re-introduction into a revised constitution. 
2. 	See Buchanan (1963) for the seminal article on earmarking. Goetz (1968) examines earmarking within 
majority-rule voting rules. See Wagner (1991) for twelve papers that focus on the economics of earmarking 
and user charges. 
3. 	 See Perez and Snell (1995). While the average for state governments is roughly 25 percent, it ranges from four 
percent in Kentucky to 87 percent in Alabama. Perhaps, because of the divorce between so-called earmarked 
taxes and beneﬁts received by earmarked-taxpayers, the practice of earmarking appears to have little inﬂuence 
on state expenditures. 
4. 	 See Buchanan (1967) and Tullock (1989) for the rather fuzzy linkages between taxes and the public’s perception 
of public-sector output. The same dichotomy exists in the halls of the federal government since revenue and 
spending committees are separated and neither has to concur with the other. 
5. 	 The starting point in the literature is Bowen (1943). The median voter model is also applicable to a committee 
procedure in which three individuals act as representatives of a larger population of voters; see Black (1958). 
6. 	 Marlow (1992) discusses how voice and exit options inﬂuence the role that voters-consumers may play in 
controlling policymakers. 
7. 	 Hettich and Winer (1984), Hunter and Nelson (1989), and Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1990) are part of an 
emerging literature that argues that tax burdens are mostly placed on voters who have little political or economic 
clout. 
8. 	 Critics, at this point, may point out that policymakers may arise to take up the slack by making informed 
decisions about government spending. This view, however, requires that policymakers have two characteristics. 
First, they must be able to know what spending should take place, which requires that they have adequate 
knowledge of the demands of millions of citizens. Of course, these critics may also question whether private 
consumers make informed judgments—in either the private or public sectors—and may be happy to assert 
paternalistic policies that over-ride the demands of less-informed voter-consumers. Second, they must not only 
receive the appropriate signals from voter-consumers, they must somehow provide policies that are consistent 
with those signals. But, the public choice literature offers rich evidence suggesting that policymaker-actions 
are partly inﬂuenced by their own narrow self-interests. 
9. 	 Moreover, the few times during the 1980s when politicians in the United States promised spending reduction 
in direct exchange for tax hikes, spending reductions never materialized. Although this promise offered pain 
(spending reduction) coupled with more pain (higher taxes), it is interesting that this promised marriage never 
materialized. 
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